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Abstract 
Purpose: The purpose of this study is to investigate whether earnings boosts before the year-
end trigger earnings management. It examines whether firms that substantially outperformed 
their last year earnings during the first three quarters push their earnings down to avoid 
reporting earnings boosts. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: Regression analysis is used to compare earnings 
management of firms with earnings boosts and other firms. 
Findings: The results indicate that firms outperforming their last year results by the end of the 
third quarter manipulate their earnings downwards by means of real activities manipulation, 
while they do not indicate income-decreasing accruals management. It is also found that, 
consistent with the prominent shift from accruals management to real activities manipulation, 
accruals management is more costly which justifies why real activities manipulation is used 
for downward manipulation. 
Research limitations/implications: The results are limited to one single earnings benchmark 
i.e. last year earnings. Further research may individually or collectively examine other 
benchmarks including analysts’ forecasts. 
Implications: The findings suggest that users should be more vigilant of firms exceeding their 
last year interim results as they could be involved in downward earnings management. 
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Originality: This study documents earnings management in a new setting where earnings 
boosts before the year-end trigger downward manipulation. 
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1.  Introduction 
There is extant evidence that managers manipulate earnings. The opportunity to manipulate 
earnings is twofold: the first is to manipulate financial reports using accounting techniques 
(accruals management, hereafter AM) and the second is to manipulate underlying 
transactions (real activities manipulation, hereafter RAM). While an overwhelming majority 
of prior studies have focused on income-increasing earnings management (e.g. Teoh et al., 
1998 a, b; Louis, 2004; Das et al., 2009; Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004; Burgstahler and 
Eames, 2006; Payne and Robb, 2000) while downward earnings management could also be 
value-destroying. For instance, downward activities manipulation could lead to the 
consumption of excessive prerequisites or unnecessary increases in other discretionary 
expenses. It may also encourage underproduction which in turn results in failure to produce 
sufficient inventory to meet future demand. All these can affect future performance rather 




The present study investigates earnings management by firms outperforming their last year 
earnings in order to avoid reporting earnings boosts. Data includes all the US firms between 
2002 and 2011 with sufficient quarterly data. Regression analysis is used to compare earnings 
management of firms with earnings boosts and other firms. As earnings manipulation is more 
likely to occur towards the year-end (e.g. see Jackson and Wilcox, 2000; Kerstein and Rai, 
2007; Jacob and Jorgensen, 2007; Cohen et al., 2010), earnings for the first three quarters 
could arguably be a fair measure of pre-managed earnings. Accordingly, this study compares 
firms substantially exceeding their last year earnings by the end of the third quarter (the 
suspects) to others in terms of their earnings management behaviour. Considering the 
prominent shift from AM to RAM, it is expected that RAM rather than AM is used by the 
suspects. The findings are in support of this expectation. This is also consistent with the shift 
from AM to RAM documented by Cohen et al. (2008). These findings are then explained by 
examining the costs of earnings management providing evidence that AM is costlier to the 
suspects than RAM.  
This study contributes to the accounting literature in a number of ways. First, although 
downward earnings management induced by management changes (e.g. Moore, 1973), 
employee stock options (e.g. Baker et al., 2003; Coles et al., 2006; Francis et al., 2016), CEO 
stock options (McAnally et al., 2008), insider purchases (Sawicki and Shrestha, 2008), labor 
negotiations (Mora and Sabater, 2008), stock repurchases (e.g. Gong et al., 2008), earnings 
reversals (Das et al., 2009), government subsidies (Jiang et al., 2018), high political costs 
(McDonnell et al., 2019) has been documented by prior studies, this study provides evidence 
of income-decreasing earnings management by firms exceeding their last year earnings by the 
end of the third quarter. We hypothesize and find evidence that the suspect firms engage in 
income-decreasing manipulation of activities. There is evidence that upward earnings 




Oxley Act in 2002 (see Koh et al., 2008). This has downplayed the role of earnings 
benchmarks in detecting earnings management. However, this study indicates that downward 
earnings management by firms exceeding benchmarks is commonplace which suggests that 
earnings benchmarks (particularly last year earnings) are still important signposts for 
identifying opportunities for earnings management. Hence, users including shareholders, 
auditors and regulators should be more vigilant of firms exceeding their last year interim 
results as they could be involved in downward earnings management. Second, this study 
contributes to the existing evidence on the tradeoff between AM and RAM the post-Enron 
era. Consistent with the prominent shift from AM to RAM (Cohen et al., 2008; Chan et al., 
2015), we show that firms use RAM, not AM, for managing their earnings downwards. 
Examining the costs of AM and RAM, we further contribute to the current literature by 
showing that RAM is less costly than AM for downward manipulation which justifies why 
we observe RAM by downward manipulators. Third, this study introduces an unprecedented 
ex-ante approach to select firms suspected of earnings management. We employ prior 
evidence that RAM occurs towards the end of the fiscal year (e.g. Jackson and Wilcox, 2000; 
Brown and Pinello, 2007; Das et al., 2009; Zang, 2012; Shon and Yan, 2015) to select the 
suspect firms. As such, unlike most previous studies (e.g. Peasnel et al., 2005; Barua et al., 
2006; Tucker and Zarowin, 2006; Roychowdhury, 2006; Francis et al., 2016) that take an ex-
post approach and use earnings after expected manipulation to identify firms suspected of 
earnings manipulation, this study introduces an ex-ante approach and uses earnings before 
expected manipulation to do so. The ubiquitous ex-post approach is subject to a backing-out 
problem (Kang and Sivaramakrishnan, 1995; Lim and Lustgarten, 2002; and Peasnell et al., 
2005) because it uses pre-managed earnings, defined as the difference between reported 
earnings and a measure of earnings management, as a proxy for earnings before expected 




would lead to a similar error in calculation of pre-managed earnings and hence results in 
invalid inferences. This study, instead, uses cumulated earnings by the end of the third 
quarter as earnings before expected manipulation which is not subject to the backing-out 
problem. This research design for selecting suspect firms is unique in the earnings 
management literature. Fourth, this is the first study to compare profit and loss firms when 
income-decreasing earnings management is expected. We suggest that in contexts where 
downward manipulation is expected, loss-making and profitable firms should be separately 
analyzed since their earnings management behaviour could be different. 
The rest of this article is structured as follows. First, a background review of prior studies is 
provided followed by the research hypotheses. Then the research methodology including the 
sample, variable measurement and empirical model are explained. Next, the results of 
descriptive and multivariate analysis are provided. Finally concluding remarks and future 
research avenues are drawn out.  
2. Background and Hypotheses 
Agency theory is the standard approach that accounting scholars adopt to research earnings 
management (Walker, 2013). The theory has long been used to explain the potential 
information asymmetry in financial reporting and its implications for the main stakeholders 
of entities. Agency theory predicts that managers manipulate their earnings to maximize their 
interests. This interest maximization could require downward manipulation of earnings. For 
instance, Healy (1985) shows that, in addition to income-increasing earnings management, 
managers engage in income-decreasing manipulation in order to maximize their bonuses. 
There are various incentives for managers to prefer lower earnings including to avoid 




(e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995) and to avoid higher expectations for the future (DeGeorge 
et al., 1999).  
According to prospect theory, to evaluate a firm’s performance, users of financial statements 
rely on earnings benchmarks instead of absolute value of earnings (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979). Performance benchmarks are usually in the form of earnings thresholds. As DeGeorge 
et al. (1999) point out, the importance of earnings-related benchmarks to managers is due to 
the emphasis those who are interested in firms’ performance, including board of directors, 
investors, and analysts, or in firms’ viability including customers, suppliers, bankers and 
employees, place on meeting benchmarks. They refer to this tendency to meet benchmarks as 
“threshold mentality”. Empirical evidence supports the importance of beating performance 
benchmarks. For instance, DeAngelo et al. (1996) report that the market negatively reacts to 
firms that break a pattern of earnings growth. Firms with a broken pattern of earnings growth 
experience about 14% negative abnormal return in the year of earnings decline and do not 
show a positive abnormal return over three years after the decline. Barth et al. (1999) 
document a significant decrease in price-to-earnings ratio when a prior pattern of earnings 
growth is broken. A survey by Graham et al. (2005) reveals that the primary objectives of 
managers for meeting earnings benchmarks are to improve stock prices and to increase their 
own reputation.  
There is extensive evidence on earnings management to meet earnings targets (e.g. 
Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Burgstahler and Eames, 2006; Daske et al., 2006; Gunny, 
2010; Das et al., 2009) as well as other performance targets including current ratios (Dyreng 
et al., 2017) and bank capital ratios (Orozco and Rubio, 2018). Benchmark beating earnings 
management can result in downward manipulation. As Peasnell et al. (2005) point out, 




increased earnings targets in the future and shifting positive earnings to future periods can 
make it easier to meet future earnings targets. Prior research also suggests that managers 
prefer smooth earnings, overstating in bad times and saving for the future in good times 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995; DeFond and Park, 1997; 
Peasnell et al., 2005) since volatile earnings are perceived as risky and make future earnings 
less predictable (e.g. Graham et al., 2005). The tendency to report smooth earnings suggests 
that if before the year-end earnings are above the expected target, managers have incentives 
to push them down to avoid reporting a large increase in their reported earnings. Therefore, 
firms with earnings boosts (the suspects) are expected to manager their earnings downwards. 
This leads to the first research hypothesis: 
  
H1: Firms with earnings boosts  exhibit income-decreasing real activities manipulation. 
There is evidence of a shift from AM to RAM in the post-Enron era, which suggests that the 
suspects may not use AM. If accruals are not managed, then a statistical artefact without 
manipulation could result in the suspects reporting higher abnormal accruals. This is because 
the suspects are those with substantial earnings growth, which in turn leads to higher total 
accruals. Considering the direct relationship between total and abnormal accruals, this would 
result in higher abnormal accruals. Therefore, the suspects are expected to have higher 
discretionary accruals which forms the second hypothesis: 
H2: Firms with earnings boosts exhibit income-increasing discretionary accruals.  





Taking into consideration the approach taken by this study to select suspect firm-years and 
the need for quarterly information, the sample is selected from the US listed firms because 
they are obliged to report quarterly financial statements. Data is collected from DataStream 
and includes all the US firms between 2002 and 2011 with sufficient quarterly data2. Firms 
operating in regulated industries (SIC codes 4400-4999) and banks and financial institutions 
(SIC codes 6000-6499) are excluded from the sample as they have different incentives for 
financial reporting compared to firms in other industries (Matsumoto, 2002). The models for 
earnings management are run cross-sectionally for every year and industry, where industries 
are identified by two-digit SIC codes. Running the regressions by industries can potentially 
reduce the effect of possible seasonality as it is expected that firms operating in the same 
industry are similarly affected by the impact of any potential seasonality.3 A minimum of 15 
observations is required for each industry-year group and industry-years with fewer 
observations are removed. Applying all these criteria leaves the sample with 23,524 
observations from 52 industries representing 4,098 unique firms. To lessen the effect of 
outliers, all the continuous variables are winsorized at 1 percent tails.  
3.2. Selection of Suspect Observations 
Capital market motivations are considered as the most significant motivation for earnings 
management (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010) and particularly earnings management toward 
benchmarks is well-documented in the literature (e.g. Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). As for 
income-decreasing earnings management, a common methodology is to test pre-managed 
earnings as the difference between earnings and an earnings management measure. This 
                                                          
2 Since the sample period includes the period of financial crisis and the crisis could affect our findings, the 
sample is divided into crisis (i.e. 2007 through 2009) and non-crisis periods. The main results substantially hold 
for both periods. Including a dummy variable for crisis period does not either change the initial results. 
3 Moreover, given that seasonality signifies a regular predictable pattern that repeats every year, seasonality 
could be a serious concern if different quarters were compared, while we compare earnings made during the first 




approach is subject to backing-out problem which can potentially affect both suspect firms 
selection and estimation of earnings management. The research design of the present study 
addresses this issue. 
Considering the time when manipulation takes place could help in its detection. The timing of 
earnings management is particularly useful when researchers examine the manipulation of 
earnings towards a target (Das et al., 2009). The timing of RAM is restricted by the fact that 
it must be carried out during the year when activities are still running. Given that RAM as a 
deviation from the optimum/normal level of activities is costly to firms, it is expected that 
firms postpone it until they have enough information to ensure that the required earnings 
cannot be otherwise met (Cohen et al., 2010). Therefore, RAM is more likely to occur 
towards the end of the fiscal year. Quarterly analysis of earnings, which is shown to be 
superior to yearly analysis (Jha, 2013), also yields results consistent with late manipulation of 
earnings (e.g. Kerstein and Rai, 2007; Jacob and Jorgensen, 2007; Cohen et al., 2010).  
Provided that manipulation of real activities is more likely to occur near the year-end, or 
more technically in the fourth quarter of the fiscal year, earnings for the first three quarters 
could be thought of as a fair measure of pre-managed earnings. Furthermore, Last year 
performance has been shown by prior studies to be an important target (see DeGeorge et al., 
1999). If pre-managed earnings are above earnings targets, firms may decide to push their 
earnings down in order to avoid reporting earnings boosts. Therefore, we select the suspects 
based on their performance during the first three quarters of the fiscal year expecting that 
firms substantially exceeding their last year performance by the end of the third quarter 
engage in income-decreasing manipulation. 
 




3.3.1. Dependent Variables 
Following Roychowdhury (2006), abnormal levels of cash flow from operations, production 
costs and discretionary expenses are employed to capture RAM. The following model is run 
for normal cash flow from operations: 
CFOit
TAi,t−1









+  εit          (1) 
where CFOit is cash flow from operations in year t for firm i; Sit is net sales in year t; ∆Sit is 
net sales in year t less net sales in year t-1; TAit−1 is total assets in year t-1; and εit is the 
residual.  
Discretionary expenditures have long been established in the earnings management literature 
as an efficient and instant tool for earnings manipulation. This is because under accounting 
standards such spending is not permitted to be capitalised and instead immediately expensed 
(Xu et al., 2007). The following is used to model normal discretionary expenses, defined as 
the sum of R&D, advertising, and selling, general and administrative expenses: 
DEit
 TAi,t−1






+  εit        (2) 
where DEit is discretionary expenses in year t. 
Manipulation of production can change operating profit. Production costs are defined as sum 
of cost of goods sold and inventory change. The following regression is run to estimate 
normal production costs: 
PCit
 TAi,t−1
















where PCit is production costs in year t for firm i; ∆Sit−1 is net sales in year t-1 less net sales 
in year t-2. 
The difference between actual and expected cash flow from operations using the 
corresponding industry-year regression is defined as abnormal cash flow from operations. 
Abnormal discretionary expenses and production costs are also calculated using the same 
logic.  













+ εit          (4) 
where TACCit is the difference between earnings and CFO in year t, PPEit is gross property, 
plant, and equipment in year t and △ RECit is receivables in year t less receivables in year t-1. 
3.2.2. Independent Variable  
The independent variable in this study is an indicator variable which denotes whether a firm-
year observation is suspected of earnings management. Firms suspected of downward 
manipulation have experienced earnings boosts which creates the opportunity for income-
decreasing actions. Last year comparable earnings are considered as the performance target 
that can motivate earnings management (DeGeorge et al., 1999; Graham et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, Fan et al. (2010) provide evidence of earnings manipulation to meet/beat 
earnings of last year’s same quarter. Accordingly, this study considers last year’s same 
quarter earnings as the required minimum earnings that managers wish for, thus firms with 
earnings in excess of the comparable number of last year are expected to indicate downward 
                                                          




earnings management. Given that earnings management is likely to occur towards the end of 
the fiscal year, which is technically the fourth quarter, if sum of earnings of a firm for the first 
three quarters in the current year is significantly higher than that of last year, the firm is 
classified as suspected of earnings management.  
3.2.3. Empirical Model and Control Variables 
To examine the research hypotheses, the measures of earnings management are regressed on 
an indicator variable denoting whether an observation is suspected of earnings manipulation. 
The following pooled cross-sectional regression is run with a year indicator to account for 
any variation attributable to year effects: 
𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸)𝑡−1 + 𝛽2(𝑀𝑇𝐵)𝑡−1 + 𝛽3(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇)𝑡 +
∑ 𝛽5,𝑗𝑗 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡          (5) 
Where SIZE is the logarithm of the market value of equity at the beginning of the year, MTB 
is market to book ratio at the beginning of the year, and ROA is net income before 
extraordinary items scaled by lagged total assets. SUSPECT is an indicator variable that is set 
equal to 1 if an observation belongs to the suspects and 0 otherwise. SUSPECT takes 1 if the 
earnings for the first three quarters of year t is 50 percent more than that of the same period of 
last year, or: 
𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇 = 1 𝑖𝑓 
𝐸𝑡,𝑄1 + 𝐸𝑡,𝑄2 + 𝐸𝑡,𝑄3
𝐸𝑡−1,𝑄1 + 𝐸𝑡−1,𝑄2 + 𝐸𝑡−1,𝑄3
≥ 1.5, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
Et,Qj denotes earnings for the quarter j of year t. The dependent variable, EMMt , represents 
four measures of earnings management. The model for each dependent variable is run with a 




Size, growth rate and performance are controlled for. Dechow et al. (1995) argue that 
earnings management models that ignore performance may be biased and that not considering 
performance may interfere with statistical inferences from the models. McNichols (2000) 
provides empirical evidence of a positive association between return on assets and earnings 
management. Thus, performance is controlled for using the return on assets ratio (ROA), 
calculated as net income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged total assets. Firms in 
different stages of the business cycle vary by future growth opportunities. Firms with high 
growth rates are expected to have higher working capital and are also more likely to engage 
in earnings management (McNichols, 2000). Dechow et al. (1998) indicate that growth firms 
need higher working capital as a response to increased sales. This implies that the variation in 
earnings management measures which is attributable to growth is not discretionary and 
should be controlled for (Collins et al., 2016). To control for growth opportunities, market to 
book ratio is included in the model. It should be noted that since dependent variables are 
expressed as deviation from industry-year means, all the above control variables are also 
similarly measured (Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2012).  
3.3. Trade-Off between Real Activities Manipulation and Accruals Management 
In addition to testing RAM and AM individually, we also exploratorily examine the trade-off 
between RAM and AM for firms suspected of income-decreasing earnings management. In 
doing so, we follow Zang (2012) who uses Heckman (1979) two-step method. The first step 
involves running the following probit model using all the firm-year observations to extract 
the inverse Mills ratio, which will then be used in the second step5.  
𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸)𝑡−1 + 𝛽2(𝑀𝑇𝐵)𝑡−1 + 𝛽3(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑁𝑂𝑆)𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽5,𝑗𝑗 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡          
(6) 
                                                          
5 Since we examine income-decreasing earnings management, variables related to income increasing 




Since earnings targets tend to be expressed per share, NOS𝑡 which is the log of number of 
outstanding shares, is included in the model. All other variables are as previously defined. 
The second step involves testing the relationship between the level of earnings management 
and its costs which is carried out separately for RAM and AM using the following 
regressions: 
RAM𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽1,𝑘𝑅𝐴𝑀_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑘,𝑡 +𝑘 ∑ 𝛽2,𝑙𝐴𝑀_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑙,𝑡 +𝑙 ∑ 𝛽3,𝑚𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑚,𝑡 +𝑚 𝑢𝑡                (7) 
AM𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛾1,𝑘𝐴𝑀_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑘,𝑡 +𝑘 ∑ 𝛾2,𝑙𝑅𝐴𝑀_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑙,𝑡 + 𝛾3,𝑛𝐸𝑋𝑃_𝑅𝐴𝑀𝑡 + 𝛾4,𝑝𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑃_𝑅𝐴𝑀𝑡𝑙 +
∑ 𝛾5,𝑚𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑚,𝑡 +𝑚 𝑣𝑡              (8) 
RAM𝑡 is the total amount of activities manipulation in year t computed as the sum of 
abnormal discretionary expenses multiplied by minus one and abnormal production costs6, 
and AM𝑡 is accruals management captured from Equation (4). RAM_COST denotes the costs 
of involvement in activities manipulation which includes market share, financial health, 
institutional ownership and marginal tax rate. Market share of a firm at the beginning of the 
period (MS𝑡−1) is measured as the ratio of a firm’s sales revenue to the total sales of its 
corresponding industry using two-digit SIC codes. The higher the market share, the lower the 
cost of RAM. Financial health is measured by Altman’s Z-score (Altman, 1968) at the 
beginning of the period (Z_SCORE𝑡−1). Healthier firms are expected to have lower RAM 
costs. Institutional ownership is captured by the percentage of institutional ownership at the 
beginning of the period (IOWN𝑡−1) and is expected to have a direct relation to the cost of 
RAM. The last cost is marginal tax rate (MTR𝑡) proxied by the effective tax rate in year t. 
AM_COST denotes the costs of accruals management including presence of Big Four 
Auditors (BIG_FOUR𝑡) and two measures of accounting system flexibility i.e. net operating 
assets at the beginning of the period (NOA𝑡−1) and the length of operating cycle (OC𝑡−1). Big 
                                                          




Auditors are expected to deliver higher quality audits making AM costly for their clients. On 
the other hand, lower flexibility of accounting system increases the cost of involvement in 
AM. 
In both equations, size, growth and profitability are controlled for using variables that are 
previously defined i.e. SIZE𝑡, MTB𝑡, and ROA𝑡, respectively. The inverse Mills ratio (IMR𝑡) 
extracted from the RAM model (Equation 7) is included in the AM model (Equation 8) to 
account for any potential selection bias. Since AM depends on the expected and unexpected 
levels of activities manipulation, EXP_RAM 𝑡 and UNEXP_RAM 𝑡 are also included in the AM 
model. EXP_RAM 𝑡 is the predicted level of activities manipulation and UNEXP_RAM 𝑡 is the 
residual, both extracted from Equation (7).  
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics  
Table 1 reports descriptive analysis of the whole sample as well as a comparison between the 
suspects and the rest of the sample. The first striking point is that the suspects (n = 9,330) 
constitute almost 40 percent of the entire sample, which indicates that the opportunity for 
income-decreasing earnings management is abundant. The suspects on average have less net 
income at $272 million compared to $385 million for the rest of the sample. In terms of 
market value of equity, the suspects are substantially smaller than others as they have a mean 
market value of equity of $1962 million while that of non-suspects is $3555. Turning to 
growth, the average market to book value for all firm-years is 3.25 while the suspects have a 
greater market to book value (mean MTB= 3.90) compared with the rest of the sample (mean 
MTB = 2.82). Furthermore, means and medians of almost all the variables are significantly 
different for suspects and non-suspects which suggests that the indicator variable splits the 




flow from operations, lower production costs and greater discretionary expenses compared to 
the rest of the sample, which are all consistent with the predictions in the research hypotheses 
as they suggest income-decreasing actions by the suspects. However, the suspects have 
higher absolute and scaled accruals than the rest of the sample, which is in line with the 
second hypothesis. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the variables used in Equation (5) separately for the 
suspects (n = 9330) and the rest of the sample (n = 14194), as well as the correlations. 
Suspect firm-years show a negative mean for abnormal cash flow from operations (ABNCFO 
= -0.0143), a positive mean for abnormal discretionary expenses (ABNDE = 0.0227) and a 
negative mean for abnormal production costs (ABNPC=-0.0013) which are all consistent 
with the research hypotheses as they all suggest downward manipulation. The mean of all the 
measures of earnings management for the entire sample is very close to zero. This is as 
anticipated since with a large sample it is expected that on average abnormal figures approach 
zero. The sign of the mean of earnings management measures for the suspects are as 
predicted in the research hypotheses, and the sign for non-suspects are exactly the opposite. 
In addition to providing initial evidence for rejecting null hypotheses, this provides 
corroborating evidence that the variable SUSPECT is an effective partitioning variable as it 
divides the sample into two groups that are different in terms of earnings management.  
Pearson (lower triangle) and Spearman (upper triangle) correlations for the variables in 
Equation (5) are presented in Panel B. The correlation between abnormal cash flow from 
operations and abnormal accruals is consistent with Roychowdhury (2006), Cohen et al. 




negatively correlated to each other, which is also consistent with the results reported by 
Roychowdhury (2006), Cohen et al. (2008) and Chi et al. (2011).  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
4.2.Main Results 
As predicted in the first hypothesis, Table 3 shows that the coefficient on SUSPECT for CFO 
model is negative (-0.0145) and significant at 1% which suggests income-decreasing 
manipulation. The coefficient on SUSPECT for the production costs model is negative (-
0.0069) and significant at 5% which also suggests downward manipulation.  This is 
consistent with prior studies that indicate firms manipulate their production to report a 
favourable earnings figure (e.g. Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2012; and Cook et al., 2012). As 
previously mentioned, manipulation of discretionary expenses is probably the most 
convenient way to manage earnings. This is well reflected in the positive sign, magnitude and 
significance of the coefficient on SUSPECT in the discretionary expenses model, since the 
coefficient is positive, i.e. income-decreasing, and is the largest amongst all the models. 
These results are consistent with those of Comprix et al. (2006) who report that firms increase 
their selling, general and administrative expenses to reduce their earnings. It is worth noting 
that out of 9,330 observations that showed at least 50 percent increase in their earnings during 
the first three quarters compared to their last year performance, only 34.3% have continued 
this improvement in the fourth quarter and majority of the suspects (65.7% or 6,133 
observations) show lower performance by the end of the year which corroborates the income-
decreasing real activities manipulation evidence revealed by the regression results 
The second hypothesis is devoted to the behaviour of the suspects in terms of AM. The 
suspects have abnormal accruals that are 0.8% of the total assets larger than those of the rest 
of the sample. This indicates that the suspects do not use AM for downward earnings 




shift from AM to RAM (Cohen et al., 2008) as it suggests that firms with incentives for 
income-decreasing manipulation tend to use RAM rather than AM. The abnormally higher 
accruals of the suspects could be a statistical artefact of the direct relationship between 
earnings and accruals since firms suspected of income-increasing manipulation are those with 
substantial earnings growth. In other words, in the absence of manipulation, growth in 
earnings results in higher total accruals which in turn leads to higher discretionary accruals.    
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
4.3.Trade-off Between Accruals Management and Real Activities Manipulation  
4.3.1. First-Step Heckman Results  
First-step Heckman results are presented in Table 4. The first step involves running the probit 
model (Equation 6) for the whole sample (n = 22,822) to obtain inverse Mills ratio in order to 
tackle any potential selection bias. The significantly negative coefficient on SIZE𝑡 and 
significantly positive coefficient on MTB𝑡 indicate that small and growth firms are more 
likely to engage in downward earnings management, which is consistent with our initial 
descriptive analysis reported in Table 1. The negative coefficient on NI𝑡 suggests that the 
suspects sample contains loss firms.7  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
4.3.2. Second-Step Heckman Results 
Table 5 reports summary statistics for the variables used in the second step as well as 
correlation coefficients. The results suggest that the suspects are small with a mean market 
share (MS𝑡−1) of 1% and financially healthy with a mean Z_SCORE𝑡 of above 4. In line with 
the probit model results, the mean of return on assets (ROA𝑡) is negative. The mean of BIG-
                                                          




_FOUR𝑡 is 63% which indicates that most of the suspects are audited by Big 4. Panel B shows 
Pearson (lower triangle) and Spearman (upper triangle) correlations among the variables used 
in the second step. RAM and AM are not highly correlated which implies that the suspects 
use these methods as substitutes, which is consistent with prior studies (Cohen and Zarowin 
2010; Zang, 2012; Braam et al., 2015). Generally, RAM of the suspects is not related to the 
earnings management costs while AM is negatively related to the costs. This finding suggests 
that RAM is a less costly option for downward manipulation. BIG_FOUR𝑡 is not significantly 
related to RAM while it is negatively correlated with AM, which indicates the role of quality 
audits in mitigating AM.   
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
The second step only contains firms suspected of downward manipulation (n = 2,973). The 
coefficients on the costs of RAM are generally weak and insignificant which suggests that, in 
a setting where downward earnings management is expected, the level of RAM is not related 
to the earnings management costs. In other words, RAM does not appear to be a costly tool 
for downward manipulation. Turning to the AM model, the coefficient on BIG_FOUR𝑡 is 
significantly negative which suggests that Big auditors are associated with lower levels of 
AM. The positive coefficient on NOA𝑡−1 shows that the higher the flexibility in the 
accounting system, the larger AM. The only economically significant cost of RAM is MS𝑡−1 
which implies that firms with higher market shares involve in higher AM, while the rest of 
RAM costs are only statistically (not economically) significant. In both RAM and AM 
models, low adjusted 𝑅2 suggests that the costs of manipulation may not convincingly 
explain RAM and AM in a setting where downward manipulation is expected. Particularly, in 
the RAM model, most of the costs of earnings management are statistically/economically 




model, and the coefficients are much more significant both statistically and economically. 
These findings by and large suggest that when downward earnings management is expected, 
RAM is less costly than AM. This is consistent with our initial results (see Table 3) since the 
suspects do not show income-decreasing AM while they are involved in downward RAM. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
4.4. Robustness Tests 
4.4.1. Alternative Performance Thresholds 
It has so far been assumed that the performance threshold for income-decreasing earnings 
management is 50 percent. In this section this assumption is relaxed to find out whether and 
how the results are sensitive to the change in the performance threshold. To this end, 
alternative performance thresholds are introduced ranging from 20 percent to 250 percent. To 
examine the impact of performance threshold choice on the results, Equation (5) is re-run 
using alternative definitions of SUSPECT. Table 7 provides the coefficients on SUSPECT for 
the four earnings management models. Consistent with the results of abnormal cash flow 
from operations, income-decreasing earnings management is observed for the entire range 
and SUSPECT remains negative and very significant. This is also the case with abnormal 
production costs, albeit of less magnitude and significance. Abnormal discretionary expenses 
remain very significant over the range and shows a steady increase with the amount of extra 
earnings. The results for abnormal accruals are also mainly consistent with the initial 
performance threshold. Overall, using alternative performance thresholds to select the suspect 
seems not to substantially affect the initial results where 50% was used.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 




The main criterion for determining firms suspected of income-decreasing earnings 
management is the presence of earnings boosts by the end of the third quarter. Hence, the 
suspects can include both profit and loss firms. While the empirical results are consistent with 
the expectation that the suspects manage their earnings downwards, this behaviour might 
vary depending on whether a suspect firm reports a profit or loss. Firms reporting a loss are 
generally considered as less involved in earnings management than those reporting a profit. 
Dechow et al. (2003) argue that small loss firms are expected to be similar to the average in 
terms of AM as upward earnings management to switch from a larger loss to a small loss is 
not justifiable. However, in light of the reported disappearance of zero-earnings discontinuity 
(Gilliam et al., 2015), Makarem et al. (2018) report that small loss firms are involved in 
upward manipulation of accruals and real activities. Accordingly, it is interesting to compare 
profit and loss firms in a setting where downward earnings management is expected.  
Of the entire suspects (n = 9,330), 36% are loss making (n = 3327). A loss-making firm can 
have incentives to manage its earnings downwards if it believes that the market expects a loss 
to continue and a lower improvement is sufficient to indicate good performance. Thus, the 
suspects are divided into loss-making and profitable firms to investigate any difference 
between them in terms of earnings management. Table 8 reports the results separately for loss 
making and profitable suspect firms. In general, while profitable suspect firms indicate 
income-decreasing RAM, loss making firms are engaged in income-increasing manipulation. 
Loss firms also show income-increasing abnormal accruals. The results suggest that loss 
firms push their earnings up in order to report a lower loss. However, a closer investigation of 
earnings management is required to analyse such a difference which is an interesting avenue 
for future research. 





5. Concluding Remarks 
This study provides evidence that firms that substantially outperformed their last year 
earnings during the first three quarters push their earnings down to avoid reporting earnings 
boosts. The results generally suggest that firms suspected of manipulation are involved in 
income-decreasing RAM as they exhibit lower cash flow from operation and production costs 
and greater discretionary expenses than the rest of observations. The results for AM indicate 
that the suspects have greater abnormal accruals. We argue that the abnormally higher 
accruals of the suspects could be a statistical artefact of the direct relationship between 
earnings and accruals. We also provide evidence that RAM is less costly to downward 
manipulators than AM. These findings are collectively consistent with the prominent shift 
from AM to RAM. We also report that, despite the general notion that loss firms are less 
involved in earnings management, loss firms indicate income-increasing earnings 
management. The results suggest that, when income-decreasing earnings management is 
expected, loss and profit firms should be separately examined since their behaviour could be 
different. 
While users tend to be more worried about income-increasing manipulation, our findings 
highlight the use of income-decreasing manipulation of activities which could be value-
destroying. Furthermore, this study highlights the importance of interim financial reports. The 
users should be more vigilant of firms exceeding their last year interim results as they could 
be involved in downward manipulation of real activities. 
This study solely uses one single earnings benchmark i.e. last year earnings. Although it 
seems reasonable to assume that firms that outperformed their last year earnings by a large 
margin have also exceeded other earnings benchmarks, further research may individually or 




of the earnings management behaviour of profit and loss making firms triggered by other 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics  
Variable 
Whole Sample 
 (n = 23,524) 
Suspects 
(n = 9,330) 
Rest of Sample 
(n = 14,194) 
Difference in 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Means Medians 
S ($ million) 7277.39 312.43 5288.88 158.80 8584.48 466.40 3295.59*** -307.6*** 
TA ($ million)  7553.19 419.03 5825.15 228.01 8688.93 626.39 2863.78*** -398.38*** 
MV $ (million) 2923.45 365.09 1961.81 215.52 3555.56 502.35 1593.74*** -286.83*** 
MTB 3.25 1.74 3.90 1.79 2.82 1.7 -1.0816*** 0.09*** 
CFO ($ million) 635.02 30.70 476.13 11.79 739.54 50.38 263.41*** -38.59*** 
PC ($ million) 4847.36 180.64 3578.52 87.60 5683.15 271.63 2104.63*** -184.03*** 
DE ($ million) 1421.62 65.52 1012.57 41.65 1693.75 90.68 681.18*** 49.03*** 
TACC ($ million) -294.33 -15.31 -203.61 -6.69 -354.01 -25.63 -150.40*** 18.94*** 
NI ($ million) 340.55 10.72 272.51 4.2 385.27 18.2 112.75*** 14.00*** 
S/TA 1.13 0.91 1.11 0.86 1.13 0.93 0.0208*** -0.07*** 
CFO/TA 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.0384*** -0.02*** 
PC/TA 0.80 0.57 0.78 0.51 0.81 0.59 0.0290** -0.08*** 
DE/TA 0.32 0.24 0.36 0.27 0.30 0.23 -0.0581*** 0.04*** 
TACC/TA -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.0090 0.00*** 
This table presents summary statistics for the whole sample as well as separately for suspect firms and the rest 
of sample. To lessen the effect of outliers, all the continuous variables are winsorized at 1 percent tails. *, **, 
*** indicate that the difference is significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Variable definitions: 
S = net sales or revenue  
TA = total assets 
MV = market value of equity 
MTB = market to book ratio in current year 
CFO = cash flow from operations 
PC = production costs for year t as the sum of inventory change and cost of goods sold 
DE = discretionary expenses as sum of selling, general, and administrative expenses, advertising expenses, and 
research and development expenses 
TACC = total accruals as net income before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operations 





Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Metrics of Earnings Management and Control Variables 
Panel A*: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable 
Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Suspect Rest Whole Suspect Rest Whole Suspect Rest Whole 
ABNCFO -0.0143 0.0094 0.0000 -0.0025 0.0144 0.0086 0.1876 0.1453 0.1638 
ABNPC -0.0013 0.0008 0.0000 0.0082 0.0064 0.0073 0.2361 0.2201 0.2266 
ABNDE 0.0227 -0.0151 0.0000 -0.0129 -0.0294 -0.0230 0.2522 0.2253 0.2372 
ABNACCJ 0.0062 -0.0041 0.0000 0.0076 0.0052 0.0059 0.1721 0.1353 0.1511 
SIZE 8.2209 8.6663 8.4896 8.2470 8.7363 8.5515 0.9784 0.9902 1.0093 
MTB 3.5423 3.0286 3.2323 1.6860 1.9434 1.8438 17.2211 8.0564 12.5236 
ROA -0.0172 0.0130 0.0010 0.0324 0.0455 0.0413 0.2788 0.2515 0.2631 
 
Panel B**: Pearson (Lower Triangle) and Spearman (Upper Triangle) Correlations 
Variable ABNCFO ABNPC ABNDE ABNACCJ ROA SIZE MTB 
ABNCFO  -0.39 -0.16 -0.23 0.50 0.21 0.12 
ABNPC -0.32  -0.57 0.09 -0.25 -0.09 -0.19 
ABNDE -0.27 -0.57  -0.14 -0.12 -0.06 0.15 
ABNACCJ -0.09 0.05 -0.21  0.28 -0.03 -0.03 
ROA 0.58 -0.17 -0.29 0.37  0.32 0.13 
SIZE 0.15 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 0.23  0.31 
MTB 0.01 -0.04 0.08 -0.05 -0.014 0.04  
* Panel A reports the mean, median, and standard deviation of the variables used in Equation (5). The summary 
statistics are separately provided by suspect firm-years and other firm-years, as well as the entire sample. 
Variable definitions: 
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+  𝜺𝑖𝑡 
ABNACCJ = abnormal accruals which is measured by the estimated residual from the following regression: 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1














SIZE = the logarithm of the market value of equity at the beginning of the year 
ROA = net income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged total assets 
The rest of variables are as previously defined. 
**Panel B presents correlations among the variables used in Equation (5) for the whole sample of 23524 
observations. Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients are presented in the lower (upper) triangle. Bolded 






















































Adj. 𝑹𝟐 (%) 34.59 3.36 9.43 34.59 
 
This table reports the coefficients from the following regression: 
𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸)𝑡−1 + 𝛽2(𝑀𝑇𝐵)𝑡−1 + 𝛽3(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇)𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽5,𝑗
𝑗
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡 
The above model is run separately for each model and EMM denotes earnings management measures including 
abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary expenses and abnormal 
accruals using Jones method. T statistics, reported in parentheses, are generated using Newey-West procedure to 
correct for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. 
Variables are as previously defined. 

















Table 4. First-Step Heckman Results  
      𝑺𝒖𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒕 
Intercept       1.9028*** 
(23.40) 
𝑴𝑻𝑩𝒕−𝟏       0.0045*** 
(4.64) 








     0.3607*** 
(17.91) 
Year indicators  Included 
Number of observations                                                  22,822 
Pseudo 𝑹𝟐 (%)  6.05 
 
This table presents the results of the following probit regression model as the first step of the Heckman method 
using the whole sample from 2002 to 2011. Z statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Suspectt = α + β1(SIZE)t−1 + β2(MTB)t−1 + β3(ROA)t + β4(NOS)t + ∑ β5,j
j
Yearj + εt 
NOSt is the log of number of shares outstanding in year t. All other variables are as previously defined. 
Variables are winsorised at 1% tails to reduce the impact of outliers. 



















Table 5. Descriptive Analysis for Costs of Earnings Management 
Panel A*: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean SD 25% 50% 75% 
𝐑𝐀𝐌𝒕 -0.0012 0.2318 -0.0954 0.0028 0.1060 
𝐀𝐌𝒕 0.0000 0.1511 -0.0383 0.0059 0.0478 
𝐌𝐒𝒕−𝟏 0.0103 0.0493 0.0000 0.0003 0.0027 
𝐙_𝐒𝐂𝐎𝐑𝐄𝒕 4.2536 22.1108 0.9959 2.4361 4.6235 
𝐈𝐎𝐖𝐍𝒕−𝟏 28.9032 22.5047 11.0000 24.0000 43.0000 
𝐌𝐓𝐑𝒕 29.4613 25.4185 15.3700 30.8400 37.6800 
𝐁𝐈𝐆_𝐅𝐎𝐔𝐑𝒕 0.6317 0.4823 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
𝐍𝐎𝐀𝒕−𝟏 3.5369 22.7191 0.4199 0.8361 1.9922 
𝐎𝐂𝒕 241.4886 1923.3920 78.5479 128.9196 206.3355 
𝐑𝐎𝐀𝒕 -0.0470 0.2956 -0.0557 0.0299 0.0767 
𝐒𝐈𝐙𝐄𝒕 8.2209 0.9784 0.0556 8.2469 8.9028 
𝐌𝐓𝐁𝒕 3.5423 17.2211 0.9287 1.6860 3.1077 
 
Panel B**: Pearson (Lower Triangle) and Spearman (Upper Triangle) Correlations 
 𝐑𝐀𝐌𝒕 𝐀𝐌𝒕 𝐌𝐒𝒕−𝟏 𝐙_𝐒𝐂𝐎𝐑𝐄𝒕 𝐈𝐎𝐖𝐍𝒕−𝟏 𝐌𝐓𝐑𝒕 𝐁𝐈𝐆_𝐅𝐎𝐔𝐑𝒕 𝐍𝐎𝐀𝒕−𝟏 𝐎𝐂𝒕 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝒕 𝐒𝐈𝐙𝐄𝒕 𝐌𝐓𝐁𝒕 
𝐑𝐀𝐌𝒕  0.17 0.12 -0.16 0.02 0.04 -0.00 -0.04 -0.09 -0.24 -0.02 -0.23 
𝐀𝐌𝒕 0.06  -0.11 -0.03 0.02 -0.09 -0.15 -0.01 0.10 0.06 -0.14 -0.06 
𝐌𝐒𝒕−𝟏 0.00 0.00  -0.15 0.05 0.18 0.45 -0.12 -0.20 -0.08 0.63 -0.10 
𝐙_𝐒𝐂𝐎𝐑𝐄𝒕 0.00 -0.01 -0.02  0.04 0.09 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.32 0.07 0.36 
𝐈𝐎𝐖𝐍𝒕−𝟏 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.01  -0.00 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.10 -0.02 
𝐌𝐓𝐑𝒕 0.05 -0.09 0.04 0.02 0.02  0.06 -0.03 -0.09 -0.19 0.06 -0.10 
𝐁𝐈𝐆_𝐅𝐎𝐔𝐑𝒕 -0.00 -0.03 0.45 -0.03 -0.04 0.06  0.08 -0.03 -0.03 0.60 0.09 
𝐍𝐎𝐀𝒕−𝟏 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.08  0.31 -0.08 0.18 -0.04 
𝐎𝐂𝒕 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.13  -0.07 -0.04 -0.08 
𝐑𝐎𝐀𝒕 -0.17 0.38 0.07 -0.00 0.12 -0.21 -0.03 -0.08 -0.08  0.05 0.24 
𝐒𝐈𝐙𝐄𝒕 -0.02 -0.1 0.27 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.60 -0.01 -0.02 0.021  0.27 
𝐌𝐓𝐁𝒕 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.09 -0.01 0.00 -0.07 0.03  
 
* Panel A reports the mean, standard deviation, and quartiles of the variables used in Equation (7) and Equation 
(8).  
Variable definitions: 
RAM𝑡= The total amount of activities manipulation in year t computed as the sum of abnormal discretionary 
expenses multiplied by minus one and abnormal production costs. 
AM𝑡= Accruals management captured by abnormal accruals in year t. 
MS𝑡−1= Market share of a firm at the beginning of the period measured as the ratio of a firm’s sales revenue to 
the total sales of its corresponding industry using two-digit SIC codes. 
Z_SCORE𝑡= Altman’s Z-score (Altman, 1968) at the beginning of the period. 
IOWN𝑡−1= Institutional ownership captured by the percentage of institutional ownership at the beginning of the 
period. 
MTR𝑡= Marginal tax rate proxied by the effective tax rate in year t. 




NOA𝑡−1= Net operating assets at the beginning of the period. 
OC𝑡= The length of operating cycle. 
Other variables are as previously defined. 
**Panel B presents correlations among the variables used in Equation (7) and Equation (8) for firms suspected 
of income-decreasing manipulation (n = 2,973). Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients are presented in the 






Table 6. Second-Step Heckman Results  
 RAM 
(n = 2,973) 
AM 
(n = 2,973) 




Costs of Real Activities Manipulation:   
















Costs of Accruals Management:   








    𝐎𝐂𝒕  





Control Variables:   












     𝐄𝐗𝐏_𝐑𝐀𝐌 𝒕  -0.2052*** 
(-13.49) 
     𝐔𝐍𝐄𝐗𝐏_𝐑𝐀𝐌 𝒕  0.0720*** 
(18.29) 




Year Indicators Included Included 
Adj. 𝑹𝟐 (%) 7.17 12.00 
This table reports the coefficients from the following regressions: 
RAM𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽1,𝑘𝑅𝐴𝑀_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑘,𝑡 +𝑘 ∑ 𝛽2,𝑙𝐴𝑀_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑙,𝑡 +𝑙 ∑ 𝛽3,𝑚𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑚,𝑡 +𝑚 𝑢𝑡                (7) 
AM𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛾1,𝑘𝐴𝑀_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑘,𝑡 +𝑘 ∑ 𝛾2,𝑙𝑅𝐴𝑀_𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑙,𝑡 + 𝛾3,𝑛𝐸𝑋𝑃_𝑅𝐴𝑀𝑡 + 𝛾4,𝑝𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑃_𝑅𝐴𝑀𝑡𝑙 +
∑ 𝛾5,𝑚𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑚,𝑡 +𝑚 𝑣𝑡                                                                                                                         (8) 
RAM_COST indicates the costs of involvement in manipulation of activities which includes market share 
(MS𝑡−1), financial health (Z_SCORE𝑡), institutional ownership (IOWN𝑡−1) and marginal tax rate (MTR𝑡). 
AM_COST indicates the costs of accruals management including presence of Big Four Auditors (BIG_FOUR𝑡), 
net operating assets at the beginning of the period (NOA𝑡−1) and the length of operating cycle (OC𝑡). 
EXP_RAM 𝑡 is the predicted level of activities manipulation and UNEXP_RAM 𝑡 is the residual both extracted 
from Equation (7). IMR𝑡 is the inverse Mills ratio extracted from the Equation (7). T statistics are reported in 
parentheses. All other variables are as previously defined.  















































































































This table reports the coefficients on SUSPECT from the following regression: 
𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸)𝑡−1 + 𝛽2(𝑀𝑇𝐵)𝑡−1 + 𝛽3(𝑁𝐼)𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇)𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽5,𝑗
𝑗
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡 
The above model is run separately for each model. EMM denotes earnings management measures including 
abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production cost, abnormal discretionary expenses, and abnormal 
accruals using Jones method. T statistics, reported in parentheses, are generated using Newey-West procedure to 
correct for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. 
Variable definitions: 
PT = Performance threshold (i.e. the percentage by which the earnings of the first three quarters of the current 
year are to be higher compared to that of the last year) for selecting firms as suspected of income-decreasing 
manipulation.  




































































































Adj. 𝑹𝟐 (%) 34.77 34.42 3.34 3.38 9.06 9.30 34.07 33.57 
 
This table reports the coefficients on SUSPECT from the following regression separately for profit making (n = 
6003) and loss making (n = 3327) suspect firms: 
𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸)𝑡−1 + 𝛽2(𝑀𝑇𝐵)𝑡−1 + 𝛽3(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇)𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽5,𝑗
𝑗
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡 
The above model is run separately for each model. EMM denotes earnings management measures including 
abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production cost, abnormal discretionary expenses, and abnormal 
accruals using Jones method. Newey-West procedure is used to correct for autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. 
Variable are as previously defined. 
*, **, *** represent that the coefficient is significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
